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Severability doctrine is in rough shape and has been for quite some 
time.  But one long-settled feature of that doctrine is that the severability of a 
state law is a question of state law.
1
  In The New General Common Law of 
Severability, however, Professor Ryan Scoville argues that the Supreme 
Court has recently—and wrongly—changed course.2  This contention caps 
his detailed history of the development of the Supreme Court’s approach to 
the vertical choice of law issue in severability determinations. 
Professor Scoville claims that the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in 
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England initiated a “broad 
federalization” of severability doctrine, a course change confirmed by 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
3
  By departing from the rule that the 
severability of a state law is a question of state law, Scoville further 
contends, the Supreme Court has exceeded post-Erie limits on the 
appropriate scope of federal common lawmaking power.
4
 
Professor Scoville’s rich rendering of changes in severability doctrine 
over time provides a wealth of insights into bygone judicial approaches to 
severability.  But his criticisms of the Supreme Court’s purportedly new 
general common law of severability are misplaced insofar as they are 
 
 * Associate Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. 
1. See, e.g., Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996) (per curiam) (“Severability is of course 
a matter of state law.”). 
2. Ryan Scoville, The New General Common Law of Severability, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 543 
(2013). 
3. Id. at 571. 
4. Id. at 593. 
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premised on the claim that the Supreme Court has changed the established 
vertical choice of law rule requiring federal courts to use state law in 
deciding whether a state law is severable.  The Court has made no such 
change.  Ayotte does set forth guidelines for federal courts’ use of 
severability doctrine in crafting remedies for partially unconstitutional 
statutes.  But those guidelines are consistent with the continued dependence 
of state-law severability on state law. 
To deny Professor Scoville’s specific claim of doctrinal discontinuity is 
not to dismiss the lack of judicial doctrinal rigor that he reveals with his 
thorough review of severability decisions past and present.  Federal courts 
from the top of the federal judicial hierarchy to the bottom are all over the 
map in the authorities they use and the arguments they make about 
severability.  But judicial sloppiness in implementing severability doctrine 
should be criticized as careless drift rather than unjustified innovation. 
In this solicited response to The New General Common Law of 
Severability, I first offer an interpretation of Ayotte and subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions as continuous with existing doctrine instead of a departure 
from it.  I then suggest that much of Scoville’s evidence for a federalization 
of severability doctrine is better viewed as evidence of doctrinal looseness 
rather than of doctrinal change.  I conclude by returning to the lessons of 
severability’s doctrinal history, suggesting that the prehistory of severability 
doctrine may supply a better guide for how courts should deal with problems 
of partial unconstitutionality in the future. 
I.   
To understand the role of severability doctrine in Ayotte, one must first 
understand more broadly what the Supreme Court did in the case.  In a 
unanimous decision authored by Justice O’Connor, the Court overturned a 
decision that held a New Hampshire law facially unconstitutional.
5
  That law, 
which prohibited physicians from performing an abortion on a minor without 
prior notification to a parent, had some exceptions and a judicial bypass.
6
  
But the statute did not have a general health exception.
7
  The district court 
held that this omission rendered the statute facially unconstitutional.
8
  The 
court therefore enjoined the statute’s enforcement completely, and the First 
Circuit affirmed.
9
  On review, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts 





5. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328–32 (2006). 
6. Id. at 323–24. 
7. Id. at 324. 
8. Planned Parenthood of N. New England v. Heed, 296 F. Supp.2d 59, 65 (D.N.H. 2003). 
9. See id. at 68; Planned Parenthood of N. New England v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 61 (1st Cir. 
2004). 
10. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 331. 
2012] Response 51 
 
51 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in reversing the holding of facial 
unconstitutionality is straightforward.  The key move was the Court’s 
observation that most applications of the statute would raise no constitutional 
difficulty.
11
  That is because the absence of a health exception from a 
parental notification requirement would normally make no difference to the 
health of a minor seeking an abortion.  As the Court saw it, a constitutional 
problem from the lack of a health exception in the statute would arise from 
the statute’s potential enforcement only in those relatively rare 
circumstances, such as a medical emergency, in which the delay from 
seeking parental notification (or judicial bypass) would be harmful to the 
minor’s health.12  The Supreme Court then reasoned, quite sensibly, that the 
judicial solution should be tailored to the constitutional problem—in that 
case, a problem limited to enforcement of the statute in a narrow set of 
circumstances.
13
  If targeted injunctive relief enjoining the enforcement of 
the statute in only those circumstances would be consistent with legislative 
intent, then that is what the district court should have ordered while leaving 
the state free to enforce the statute more generally.
14
 
It is only at this point that severability doctrine enters into the remedial 
calculus in Ayotte.  Specifically, the opinion reasons that severability 
doctrine requires a court weighing the issuance of a targeted injunction 
against enforcement in some circumstance but not others to ask: “Would the 
legislature have preferred what is left of its statute to no statute at all?”15 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court in Ayotte never suggests that 
the question of what the state legislature intended regarding severability is 
anything other than a question of state law.  To the contrary, the opinion 
affirmatively indicates that the question of legislative intent is a question of 
state law.  The opinion not only notes the presence of a severability clause in 
the New Hampshire law, but also observes that this could be countered by 
the challengers’ contention “that New Hampshire legislators preferred no 
statute at all to a statute enjoined in the way we have described.”16  Neither of 
these considerations about state law would have been worth noting if the 
relevant question of legislative intent were not a question of state law.  
Because the answer to the question of legislative intent remained “open” 
under the Court’s decision, the Court remanded “for the lower courts to 
determine legislative intent in the first instance.”17 
 
11. Id.  
12. See id. at 328, 331 (describing the factual basis as the following: “In some very small 
percentage of cases, pregnant minors, like adult women, need immediate abortions to avoid serious 
and often irreversible damage to their health.”). 
13. Id. at 328–29. 
14. Id. at 329–31. 
15. Id. at 330. 
16. Id. at 331. 
17. Id. 
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The Court’s opinion in Ayotte did nothing to unsettle the expectation 
that the lower courts on remand should make the legislative intent 
determination in accordance with state law.  As Professor Scoville notes, that 
is how the parties briefed the issue on remand.
18
  And that is how the district 
court understood its task as well.  The district court never ultimately decided 
the severability question because an election intervened and the newly 
constituted legislature repealed the parental notification law.  But in deciding 
a different issue, the district court explained that the Supreme Court had 
“remanded the case to have the lower court divine the intent of the New 
Hampshire legislature and to fashion a remedy accordingly.”19 
In sum, although Professor Scoville rejects a reading under which 
“Ayotte did not in fact establish a severability test,”20  that is the best reading 
of the case.  Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court left the question of 
severability to be decided on remand and did nothing to modify the rule that 
the severability of a state law is a question to be decided on the basis of state 
law. 
Nor do any post-Ayotte decisions by the Supreme Court register 
doctrinal change in this area.  Professor Scoville describes the Court’s 
decision in Randall v. Sorrell as “adopting Ayotte’s method of deciding 
severance without following state law.”21  But Justice Breyer’s opinion in 
Randall makes no mention of Ayotte and even cites a state severability 
statute.
22
  Professor Scoville discounts the state law citation because it 
appears at the end of a string cite after two Supreme Court cases.
23
  But the 
first Supreme Court precedent in the string cite sets forth the same standard 
as the state severability statute cited by the Court.
24
  And the other Supreme 
Court precedent in the string cite says that severability is “essentially an 
inquiry into legislative intent.”25  Finally, if Justice Breyer thought that 
severability was to be determined based on federal common law rather than 
state law, it is hard to explain why the citation to the state statute is in his 
Randall opinion at all. 
Professor Scoville also enlists the Supreme Court’s decisions in Free 
Enterprise v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board and National 
 
18. Scoville, supra note 2, at 589. 
19. Planned Parenthood of N. New England v. Ayotte, 571 F. Supp. 2d 265, 273 (D.N.H. 2008) 
(emphasis added). 
20. Scoville, supra note 2, at 570. 
21. Id. at 571. 
22. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006). 
23. Scoville, supra note 2, at 571 n.190. 
24. Randall, 548 U.S. at 262. Compare Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 
210, 234 (1932) (“[T]he invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as law.”), with 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 215 (2003) (“If any provision of an act is invalid, or if any application 
thereof to any person or circumstance is invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or 
applications which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.”). 
25. Randall, 548 U.S. at 262 (quoting Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 
U.S. 172, 191 (1999)). 
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Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius in support of his claim that 
there is a new general common law of severability.
26
  Those cases both dealt 
with the severability of a federal statute, and are thus of limited utility.  But 
Professor Scoville rightly observes that opinions in both of these federal-law 
cases cite a portion of the Ayotte opinion that the foregoing analysis has not 
addressed.  That is the Court’s statement in Ayotte that “[w]e prefer . . . to 
sever [a partially unconstitutional statute’s] problematic portions while 
leaving the remainder intact . . . .”27  This expression of a general preference 
in favor of severability could be viewed as a federal severance guideline of 
sorts.  But there is no reason to take it as licensing the federalization of state-
statute severability determinations.  The statement appears in a preface to the 
Court’s actual analysis.28  And that analysis not only employs the principle 
that legislative intent is “the touchstone,” but also makes clear that the 
relevant intent is the intent of the state legislature.
29
 
Professor Scoville argues that the Ayotte Court’s statement of a general 
preference favoring severability is significant because “whether to sever the 
unconstitutional applications of the New Hampshire statute was the central 
question on remand.”30  But the opinion provides no indication that the lower 
courts were to take the statement of a general preference for severability as 
authoritative in ascertaining the intent of the New Hampshire legislature.  
The Court’s expressions of a general preference for severing as one way of 
tailoring the solution to the problem sets up the requirement for the lower 
courts to consider partial invalidation before wholesale.  As it is best read, 
Ayotte instructs that courts should sever if they can, but the determination of 
whether they can depends on legislative intent. 
While I deny that the Court “federalized the severability of state 
statutes” in Ayotte, I acknowledge that the decision could be said to have 
“created federal severance guidelines for state statutes in federal court.”31  
But those guidelines do not relate to the vertical choice of law issue.  They 
are directives about when to undertake a severability inquiry (viz., before 
rendering a statute completely unenforceable) and about what severability 
depends upon (viz., legislative intent).  These guidelines do not purport to 
render state law irrelevant to the determination of the severability of state 
laws.  Indeed, it is the dependence of severability on legislative intent that 
makes the severability of state law a question of state law. 
It is certainly possible for courts to interpret Ayotte’s statement of a 
general preference for severability as requiring a thumb on the scale in favor 
of severability when weighing a state legislature’s intent regarding the 
 
26. Scoville, supra note 2, at 546–47. 
27. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328–29 (2006). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 330. 
30. Scoville, supra note 2, at 570. 
31. Id. at 547. 
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severability of state law.  But because such an interpretation fits neither the 
context for the statement in Ayotte nor the general doctrinal context, that 
interpretation should be rejected. 
II.   
Although there is no new general common law of severability, the ad 
hoc nature of most severability determinations lends some plausibility to 
Professor Scoville’s interpretation of Ayotte and subsequent cases.  But the 
better takeaway from cases that seem to depart from the established approach 
in this area is that courts (including the Supreme Court) are sometimes 
imprecise or loose in their citation and decision practices regarding 
severability. 
It is not uncommon for federal court severability decisions to include an 
indiscriminate mish-mash of authorities, lumping together cases deciding the 
severability of a state law with cases deciding the severability of a federal 
law.  Ayotte itself illustrates the mixing of authorities that one occasionally 
sees in judicial discussions of severability.  Consider, for example, the 
Court’s statement that “[a]fter finding an application or portion of a statute 
unconstitutional, we must next ask: Would the legislature have preferred 
what is left of its statute to no statute at all?”32  This statement is followed by 
a lengthy string cite that refers to seven Supreme Court cases spanning from 
1879 to 2005.  Four of these cases involved the severability of a federal 
law,
33
 two involved the severability of a state law,
34
 and one involved the 
severability of an Executive Order.
35
  But one should not make doctrinal hay 
from these disparate straws.  One should infer, perhaps, only that severability 
depends on legislative intent, not that the Court was attempting to formulate 
a definitive test for severability or trying to provide guidance about the 
source of law to use in determining the severability of a state law. 
Even when one limits one’s focus to a single case, the extent to which 
the Supreme Court believed a particular severability determination to rest on 
federal law or state law can be unclear.  For example, Professor Scoville 
describes the Supreme Court’s 1932 decision in Champlin Refining Co. v. 
Corporation Commission of Oklahoma as a pre-Erie case that decided 
whether a state statute was severable without reliance on the applicable state 
law test.
36
  And that description appears accurate.  A look at Champlin 
Refining does not reveal any Supreme Court citations of Oklahoma 
 
32. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330. 
33. United States v. Booker 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 
678, 684 (1987); The Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 501 (1908); Trade-Mark Cases, 
100 U.S. 82, 98–99 (1879). 
34. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932); Allen v. 
Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 83–84 (1881). 
35. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999). 
36. Scoville, supra note 2, at 571. 
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severability precedents.  But in a 1992 decision about the severability of an 
Oklahoma law, the Supreme Court described Champlin Refining as a 
decision “inquiring into severability under Oklahoma law . . . .”37 
In this area of the law, then, it is unsurprising to see a federal court 
citing Ayotte in deciding the severability of a state law.
38
  Nor is it significant 
that some courts cite Ayotte alongside citations of state-court precedents 
about the severability of state law.
39
  This sort of mixture need not be viewed 
as a sign of “broad federalization,”40 but rather should be viewed as a sign of 
doctrinal looseness generally. 
Professor Scoville argues that this intermixing (whether deliberate or 
not) matters because federal severance guidelines “materially differ from a 
number of state doctrines.”41  To be sure, the verbal formulations of some 
state-law severability doctrines differ from how the Supreme Court has 
formulated its approach to federal-law severability in recent years.  But these 
verbal formulations would lead to different outcomes only if the verbal 
formulations actually guided the severability determinations. 
Professor Scoville offers a stylized example to suggest that different 
formulations could lead to different outcomes.  But even under the conditions 
set forth in that example, it is far from clear that the different verbal 
formulations of doctrine would lead to different outcomes.  Scoville’s 
illustrative example has the following features: the hypothetical statute has 
three operative provisions; there is no severability clause; only one of the 
three provisions is unconstitutional; and there is legislative history that 
makes clear that the legislature would have passed the statute without that 
unconstitutional provision.  Scoville argues that this statute would be 
severable under the approach he finds in Ayotte, but that the statute would 
likely not be severable in Tennessee and South Carolina.  That is because 
Tennessee requires “fairly clear” evidence favoring severance from the plain 
text of the statute, and South Carolina “has a presumption against severance 
in the absence of a statutory severability clause.”42  I am less confident about 
what would happen in those states.  Courts in both Tennessee and South 
Carolina have severed provisions from statutes upon concluding that is what 
the legislature would have wanted, either notwithstanding the absence of a 
severability clause or without noting the presence or absence of such a 
clause.
43
  Such decisions do not prove that the verbal formulations of each 
 
37. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 460 (1992). 
38. See sources cited in Scoville, supra note 2, at 571–72 n.192. 
39. See sources cited in id. at 572 n.193. 
40. Id. at 571. 
41. Id. at 572. 
42. Id. at 573. 
43. See Thomas v. Cooper River Park, 471 S.E.2d 170, 171 (S.C. 1996) (finding a statutory 
provision separable without any mention of a severability clause); Thayer v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 413 
S.E.2d 810, 814–15 (S.C. 1992) (per curiam) (same); Nolichuckey Sand Co. v. Huddleston, 896 
S.W.2d 782, 791 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (“A long line of Tennessee Supreme Court decisions 
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state’s doctrine are necessarily irrelevant, but they do suggest that they are 
less constraining in application than might appear from the words 
themselves.  The question is one of judgment, I suppose.  My own 
impression from reviewing numerous severability decisions of both state and 
federal courts is that—in this particular area of the law, at least—the verbal 
formulations do not much matter.
44
 
Suppose, though, that the verbal formulation of a state’s severability law 
were to be crystal clear in leaving no wiggle room to avoid inseverability in a 
certain class of cases.  What then?  Suppose, for example, that a state’s 
highest court were to hold that severability is not an available judicial tool for 
saving a partially unconstitutional state statute that violates the dormant 
Commerce Clause through differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state 
businesses in separate provisions.
45
  Now suppose that a federal court 
confronts just such a statute at a later time.  Would Ayotte or any other 
Supreme Court decision post-dating the establishment of the rule that the 
severability of a state law is a question of state law really authorize the 
federal court to ignore the rule of state severability law established by the 
state’s highest court?  For all the reasons given up to this point, I think the 
answer has to be an emphatic no.  According to Professor Scoville’s analysis, 
however, the answer is a regretful yes.  We disagree. 
III.   
Whether or not Ayotte marked a change, there is little doubt from 
Professor Scoville’s detailed history of approaches to vertical choice of law 
in severability doctrine that the Supreme Court has not been very self-
conscious about shaping that specific part of severability doctrine.  
Moreover, Professor Scoville properly observes that the Court has not 
explained most of its doctrinal shifts regarding severability doctrine more 
generally, and he rightly endorses David Gans’ observation that 
“[s]everability doctrine’s strictures are routinely ignored.”46  These critical 
observations—unfortunately—echo the critical observations in Robert 
 
support[s] our conclusion that elision [i.e. severance] is appropriate under the circumstances of the 
case at bar, even without a severability clause . . . .”). 
44. Cf. Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. 
L. REV. 76, 101–02 (1937) (“The only general conclusion which can be drawn from the above 
analysis of what the Supreme Court has both said and done in solving the problem of separable 
applications is that the Court avails itself of one formula or another in order to justify results which 
seem to it to be desirable for other reasons.”). 
45. Cf. American Petroleum Inst. v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 677 S.E.2d 16, 20 (S.C. 2009) 
(holding that severability is unavailable to remedy violations of the state constitution’s one-subject 
rule). 
46. See Scoville, supra note 2 at 546 (quoting David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial 
Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639, 651 (2008)). 
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It is a real problem that thoughtful analysts continue to find severability 
doctrine insusceptible of principled application after all this time.  But while 
the history of severability doctrine is unedifying, its prehistory holds out the 
promise of a better approach to partial unconstitutionality.  As Professor 
Scoville points out, severability doctrine based on legislative intent took 
shape in the mid-to-late 1800s.
48
  But courts were dealing with the problem 
of partial unconstitutionality for decades before that.  I have described that 
older approach elsewhere, and note it here as an alternative to modern 
severability doctrine.
49
  That is because the main lesson to draw from the 
history of severability doctrine may be that courts should give up trying to 
use it and scholars should give up trying to fix it.  Perhaps, instead, we 
should move forward using a reconstructed version of the original approach 
to partial unconstitutionality. 
 
47. See Stern, supra note 44, at 76-77 (explaining that severability doctrine “has been 
embroidered by the Supreme Court with negative and positive presumptions, and with conflicting 
rules, some of which are applied in some cases and some in others—usually without any explicit 
recognition that they conflict”). 
48. See Scoville, supra note 2 at 545 n.10 (describing ninteenth-century decisions which 
emphasized legislative intent). 
49. See Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 755–68 (2010) 
(describing how courts dealt with partial unconstitutionality before the rise of the modern 
legislative-intent-based approach). 
